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IF IT AIN'T BROKE, BREAK IT - 1
HOW THE TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISMANTLED
AND DESTROYED TENNESSEE'S UNIQUELY EXCELLENT
JUDICIAL SYSTEM

By: Penny J. White 2
"The concentrating[of all government power] in the same
hands is precisely the definition of despotic government...
If therefore the legislatureassumes ... judiciarypowers,
no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it be
effectual.... The time to guardagainstcorruptionand
tyranny is before they shall have gotten hold on us. It is
better to keep the wolf out of the fold, than to trust to
drawinghis teeth and talons after he shall have entered." 3

1The

title is taken from the common phrase, "if it ain't
broke, don't fix it," popularized by Bert Lance, White
House Director of the Office of Management and Budget
under President Jimmy Carter.
2 Penny J. White is the E.E. Overton Distinguished
Professor of Law and the Director for the Center for
Advocacy and Dispute Resolution at the University of
Tennessee College of Law and previously served as a trial
and appellate judge in the state of Tennessee.
3 GORDON WOOD,

THE

CREATION OF THE

AMERICAN

1776-1787 451 (1969) (quoting Thomas
Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 13, 120-21
(1784)).
REPUBLIC,
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I.

Introduction4

In Tennessee, the wolf has entered the fold. The
Tennessee General Assembly has assumed judicial power
by reasserting its role as the "preeminent" branch of
government and reclaiming its historic dominance over the
state judiciary. This unfortunate development has led me
to write this article for a variety of reasons. For future
generations, I wish to chronicle the events that led to the
dismantling of Tennessee's unique, high-quality judicial
system.6 In this way, I seek to archive essential information
for those who trumpet the important role that fair courts
play in our society. I hope to inspire vigilance, triggering
watchful eyes as the new judiciary unfolds; and perhaps, I
also aspire to encourage efforts to draw the teeth and talons
before more damage is done.

I am grateful to Professor Judy Cornett for her insight and
ingenuity; to Jacob Feuer whose enthusiasm and acumen
inspired me; and to Jason Collver, Cassie Kamp, Benjamin
Lemly, Patrick Morrison, Brianna Powell, and David
Samples, students at the University of Tennessee College
of Law who provided excellent research assistance.
N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection - the Tennessee
Experience, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 615, 619 (1977) (noting
that Tennessee's first constitution "resembl[ed] other early
state constitutions, [and] made the popularly elected
legislature, or general assembly, preeminent").
6
I am using the phrase "judicial system" in this article to
refer to the method by which judges are selected initially
for the bench and the means by which their continued
service is determined.
-

4

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 331
II. Evolution of a Model Judicial Selection, Evaluation,
and Retention System-a/k/a Tennessee's Judicial
System Was Not Broken
The early Tennesseans gave the legislative branch
the power to control the creation, composition, and
jurisdiction of the courts. Following North Carolina's
lead,8 the first Tennessee Constitution, adopted in 1796,
provided for three separate branches of government and
granted judicial power to the courts, but left entirely to the
legislature whether to create courts at all. 9 Notably,
Tennessee's first Constitution referred to "superior" and
"inferior" courts, but did not require the legislature to
create any courts. 10 Although the legislature did create
courts "from time to time," as the Constitution provided,"
it was more than a decade before the legislature created a

For a complete discussion of the history of the Tennessee
judicial branch, see Parks, supra note 5, at 617-34; see also
Thomas R. Van Dervort, The Changing Court System, in
TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN
THE VOLUNTEER

STATE

55-64 (John R. Vile & Mark

Byrnes eds., 1998).
Tennessee was viewed as the "daughter of North
Carolina," which led her "quite naturally" to adopt the
"judicial system of the Mother State." SAMUEL C.
WILLIAMS,

PHASES OF THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF TENNESSEE 5 (1944).
9 JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, STUDIES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL

149 (2d ed. 1907).
10 The 1796 Constitution provided that "[t]he judicial
power of the state shall be vested in such superior and
inferior courts of law and equity as the legislature shall,
HISTORY OF TENNESSEE

from time to time, direct and establish."
V, § 1 (1796).
11

Id

TENN. CONST.

art.
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court of last resort and even then, the legislature retained
the power to abolish the Tennessee Supreme Court until
1835. 12 Only with the passage of Tennessee's 1834
Constitution did the Tennessee Supreme Court gain
constitutional status, sufficient to forbid its abolition by the
legislature. 13
This legislative preeminence in Tennessee was
consistent with the model in place in most states during the
early days of the Nation. 14 But this legislative dominance
The Tennessee Supreme Court was created in 1809, but
was not given appellate jurisdiction until 1819. That
appellate jurisdiction did not become exclusive until 1834.
WILLIAMS, supra note 8, at 75-76.
13 Id. at 76-77.
The 1834 Constitution vested judicial
power in "one Supreme Court [and] in such Inferior Courts
as the Legislature shall from time to time ordain and
establish." TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1834).
14 Despite the separation of powers provided for in Article
III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution, the framers
had mixed feelings about the implications of the separation
of powers doctrine, in general, and about what would come
to be known as judicial independence, in particular. John
Adams, for example, believed "that the judicial power
ought to be distinct from both the legislative and executive,
and independent upon both, that so it may be a check upon
both ... ." 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 198 (C. Adams,
ed.
1851).
Others, including
Thomas
Jefferson,
occasionally, held an altogether different view of the role of
the courts. In a letter to Edmund Pendleton written just
eight years before the quote that introduces this article,
Jefferson advocated that "mercy [should] be the character
of the law-giver, but . . . the judge [should] be a mere
machine." Letter to Edmund Pendleton, Document 9 (Aug.
26, 1776) in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (J. Boyd,
ed. 1950). Initially, according to historian and scholar
12
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was short-lived, due in part to the public's growing "fear of
legislative despotism" and the resulting threat to individual
freedom. 15 Additionally, with the establishment of the
power of judicial review1 6 came the realization that courts
would assume prominence as guardians of individual
sovereignty and, thus, should be more accountable to the
public.1 7
Over the course of the next two centuries, states
detached their judiciaries from legislative control by
removing judges from legislative appointment and adopting
a variety of other selection methods for state court judges.
Initially, most states moved to partisan elections believing
that judges who were accountable to the voters would be
more independent. This idea was prompted by the
principles of Jacksonian democracy and the emergence of
the populist movement. 18 But "by the early twentieth
century, elective judiciaries were increasingly viewed as
plagued by incompetence and corruption." 19 The growth of

Gordon Wood, "[t]he Revolutionaries had no intention of
curtailing legislative interference in the court structure and
in judicial functions, and in fact they meant to increase it."
WOOD, supra note 3, at 161.

Id. at 453-54. As Wood explains, this fear was brought
about by legislative overreaching and the public's reaction
to the effect that this abuse of power had on the judicial
function.
Id.
16
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
17 Parks, supra note 5, at 622-625 (stating
that the "single
most significant manifestation of the changing conception
of the judicial function was the emergence of the doctrine
of judicial review."). Id. at 622.
" Id. at 624-25.
19 Stephen P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective
Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689,
723 (1994).
15
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a more urban and industrialized society had complicated
the law, demanding that judges be skilled and intelligent,
rather than partisan and political.
Some states turned to nonpartisan elections to solve
20
the issues of incompetence and political cronyism, but
other states, prompted by professional organizations,
tinkered with creating judicial selection and retention
methods that would insulate judges more completely from
the political aspects of the electoral process. 21 By 1990,
almost half of the states had adopted a new model - a socalled merit selection system - as the selection method for
state judges.2 2 Under merit selection systems, a broadbased commission comprised of diverse and representative
individuals screens and evaluates candidates for judicial
office. Following a rigorous application and vetting
process, the commission nominates the most qualified
candidates to the appointing authority, generally the
governor, who makes the judicial appointment. Tennessee

F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial
Independence, Institutional Changes in State Courts, 33 J.
LEGAL. STUD. 431, 442 (2004) (noting that by 1930, twelve
states had adopted nonpartisan elections as their method of
judicial selection).
21 Parks, supra note
5, at 632.
22 Charles Gardner Geyh, Methods of
Judicial Section
Their Impact on Judicial Independence, 2008 DAEDALUS
88-89 (2008) in Paul J. De Muniz & Phillip Schradle, A
Modest Proposalfor Selection of Oregon Judges, 75 ALB.
L. REv. 1759 (2012)(Professor Geyh also refers to this
statistic in the background papers for "The Debate Over
Judicial Elections and State Court Judicial Selection," a
2007 conference sponsored by the National Center for State
Courts and the Sandra Day O'Connor Project on the State
of the Judiciary. The background papers are on file in the
author's archives.).
&

20
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joined the group of states opting for merit over politics and
adopted the Tennessee Plan, a merit-based selection system
for appellate court judges in 1971. 23
Despite this progressive step by Tennessee's 1971
bipartisan General Assembly, 24 the Tennessee Plan became
the spoils of a highly partisan battle between a Republican
governor and a Democratic legislature in 1974, leading to
the repeal of the Plan as it applied to the Tennessee
25
Supreme Court. Over the next twenty years, judicial
reform in Tennessee would arguably fail miserably (when a
cumbersome 1500-word amendment to the judicial article
was rejected by the voters in the 1977 Limited
Constitutional Convention 26 ) and succeed beyond all
expectations when, in 1994, another bipartisan General

For all of the versions of Tennessee's judicial selection,
evaluation, and retention statutes, other than the current
version, I will cite to the original public chapter number in
order to avoid confusion. 1971 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 198
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-701). Trial judges in
Tennessee continued to be chosen in popular elections. I
use the phrase "the Tennessee Plan" and the phrase
"Tennessee's judicial selection, evaluation, and retention
system" to designate the manner of judicial selection,
evaluation, and retention set out in the 1971 and 1994
statutes.
24 The 87th Tennessee General Assembly consisted of 20
Democrat, 12 Republican, and 1 American Independent
Senators, http://www.tn.gov/tsla/history/misc/tga-senate3.p
df, and 56 Democrats and 43 Republicans Representatives,
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/house/archives/87GA/Members/
Members.htm.
25 Van Dervort, supra note 7, at 62; Penny J. White
Malia Reddick, A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The
Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REv. 501, 510-12 (2008).
26 See White & Reddick, supra note
25, at 515-19.
&

23

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 336
Assembly 27 provided that all judicial vacancies would be
filled by merit-based appointments. This returned the
Tennessee Supreme Court to retention elections and
marked the first time in Tennessee's history that the
appointment of trial judges had been removed from a
28
system of pure political patronage.
Under the 1994 Tennessee Plan, the Governor was
required to fill judicial vacancies from a list of three
nominees provided by the Judicial Selection Commission
(JSC).29 By statute, the JSC's membership was required to
reflect diversity. 30 Trial judges appointed under the
Tennessee Plan held their seats until the next general
election, at which time they ran in popular elections. But
The

General Assembly consisted of 19 Democrat
and 14 Republican Senators, http://www.tn.gov/tsla/history
y/misc/tga-senate3.pdf,
and 64 Democrat and 35
Republican Representatives, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/hou
se/archives/98GA/Members/Members.htm
28 Van Devort, supra note 7, at 64.
29 The Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission
consisted
of 15 members, appointed by the Speaker of the House and
Senate from recommendations made by the Tennessee Bar
Association, the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, the
District Attorneys General Conference, the Tennessee
Defense Lawyers Association, and the Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 1994 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4-102).
30 Id.
(including requirements that the Commission
"approximate the population of the state with respect to
race and gender;" include representation "from the
dominant ethnic minority population;" that the Speakers
reject any list that did not "reflect the diversity of the
state's population;" and requiring the nominating groups
and speakers to "intend to select a commission diverse as to
race and gender"). See Van Dervort, supra note 7, at 64-65
27

9 8 th
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appellate judges appointed under the Tennessee Plan ran in
retention elections, thus returning Tennessee's appellate
courts to a full merit-based selection and retention system.
31 In
addition to adopting merit-based selection and
retention for appellate court judges, the General Assembly
added a unique dimension to the selection system, adopting
a judicial performance evaluation system that was new to
Tennessee and unique in the Nation.3 2
Despite the increased use of and support for meritbased judicial selection systems, critics expressed concerns
about the retention aspects of merit-based systems. In all
but a very few states,3 3 judges selected via a merit-based
selection system were reviewed periodically by the
electorate who voted whether the judges should be retained
in office. Opponents of merit-based systems charged that
retention elections did not entice voter interest and that
those who did vote did not have sufficient information
about incumbent judges to enable them to cast informed
votes on retention. 34 At its core, this criticism was based on
the presumption that party labels provided relevant

1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 17-4-101 & -102); Van Devort, supra note 7, at
64.
32 White & Reddick, supra note 25, at 519; 1994 Tenn.
31

Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §17-4101 (1994)).
33 Only Rhode Island appoints state court judges for life;
judges in New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Massachusetts
serve until age 70. http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
selection/methods/selection ofjudges. cfm? state.
34 See generally James Bopp, Jr., The Perils of Merit
Selection, 46 IND. L. REv. 87, 97 (2013).
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information to voters about candidates,3 5 a presumption that
is fallacious when applied to judges.
In order to address the criticisms and confront the
fallaciousness head on, a small minority of merit-selection
states began to experiment with methods of evaluating
judicial performance 3 6 for the purpose of providing voters
with relevant information about judges' performance and
identifying areas in which judges needed to improve. 37 By

See generally Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita, Informative Party labels with Institutional and
Electoral Variation, 20 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL
POLITICS 251, 251 (2008) (citing studies that support the
proposition that in traditional elections "party labels
provide voters with information about candidates"). To
prove low voter interest, critics of merit selection rely upon
ballot roll-off percentages. Because judicial races are often
at the bottom of the ballot, the phenomenon of ballot roll
off results in voters not casting a vote in those races. The
percentage of ballot roll off is calculated by determining
the number of voters who cast ballots but who did not
complete their ballots by voting in each contest. Critics
cited ballot roll-off percentages as proof of low voter
interest. See Seth S. Andersen, Judicial Retention
EvaluationPrograms, 34 LoY. L. REV. 1375, 1377 (2001)
(discussing various complaints about retention elections).
36 For more than a century, bar groups and associations had
polled members as a means of evaluating judicial
performance, but bar poll results were (and are) regarded
largely as assessing a judge's popularity and not as a
meaningful measurement of judicial performance. JAMES
H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E. MEDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF
THE BAR:
A NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING
PRACTICES 2 (1977).
37 Richard L. Aynes, Evaluation of JudicialPerformance:
A Tool for Self-Improvement, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 261-70
35
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providing voters with objective, relevant information about
judges' performance, voters could cast informed ballots.
Thus, judicial performance evaluations, though scarcely
used, were a "key component of efforts to make judicial
elections more meaningful contests. ,,38
As states experimented with judicial performance
evaluations for self-improvement, the American Bar
Association (ABA) drafted and adopted guidelines to
objectify judicial evaluations. The Guidelines for
Evaluation of Judicial Performance, consists of concrete
principles and explanatory commentary concerning the
adoption and implementation of a judicial performance
system. 39 While the adoption of the ABA Guidelines
prompted more states to adopt performance guidelines for
judicial self-improvement, the number of states that utilized
judicial performance as a means of informing the electorate
about judicial qualifications remained very small.
The early pioneers in the use of judicial
performance evaluations were New Jersey, Colorado, and
Alaska, but Tennessee, which adopted its program in 1994,
was not far behind. Moreover, unlike many of the pioneers,
Tennessee's judicial performance evaluation program (JPE)
included the dual purposes of promoting voter awareness
and self-improvement from the outset. While other
programs focused exclusively on identifying areas for
judicial self-improvement during the first decade of the
programs' existence, Tennessee's JPE contained a robust

(1981); Penny J. White, JudgingJudges: SecuringJudicial
Independence by Use of JudicialPerformanceEvaluations,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1064-66 (2002).
38 Andersen, supra note 35, at 1375.
39 ABA

SPECIAL COMM.

PERFORMANCE,
JUDICIAL
"GUIDELINES").

ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL

GUIDELINES
PERFORMANCE

FOR

THE

(1985)

EVALUATION

OF

(hereinafter
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voter awareness and self-improvement component from the
very start.4 0
Thus, the 98th Tennessee General Assembly added
Tennessee to that very short list of states willing to devote
state resources to assure that an informed electorate made
judicial
retention decisions.
The Tennessee Plan
incorporated a rigorous performance evaluation program
that had been developed and scrutinized by members of the
bench and the bar 4 1 and that placed Tennessee in the
forefront. With the adoption of the Tennessee Plan, the
Tennessee Municipal League, for example, proudly boasted
that Tennessee became the "only state with a judicial

See White, supra note 37, at 1066-67. Both a lack of
resources and a lack of support led some states to use
judicial performance evaluations exclusively for judicial
self-improvement.
41 Justice Bill Koch, who was at the time a Court of
Appeals Judge, and I chaired the committee appointed by
the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Tennessee Judicial
Conference to study and determine whether to propose a
judicial performance evaluation system for Tennessee's
judges. The committee, consisting of lawyers and judges,
worked for months reviewing the few judicial performance
evaluation programs in existence, consulting with experts,
and drafting proposals. To my knowledge, the significant
amount of energy, resources, and relationship capital
invested to propose and ultimately adopt Tennessee's JPE
has not been documented. My archives (and I am sure the
archives of Justice Koch and others) contain reams of
evidence documenting the amount of work involved as well
as the degree of difficulty encountered in proposing and
gaining acceptance of JPE by Tennessee's lawyers, judges,
and legislators.
40
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evaluation program this expansive, and only one of eight
states with a program." 42
From its inception, Tennessee's expansive JPE
embraced multiple vital objectives: assuring a "responsive
and respected appellate judiciary,"4 3 providing a means of
improving the quality of justice by improving individual
judge's judicial skills, 4 4 and promoting "informed retention
decisions." 4 5 By connecting JPE with the Tennessee Plan's
broad-based selection system and retention elections, the
General Assembly and the courts worked hand in hand to
select a qualified judiciary, to improve judicial
performance, and to "aid the public in evaluating the
performance of [incumbent appellate] judges." 4 6 In addition
to acknowledging the acute importance of an exceptional
appellate judiciary, the implementation of JPE alleviated
accountability concerns voiced by some critics of retention
elections4 7 by providing an evaluative process "based on a
well-defined set of non-political performance criteria."48

Tennessee Municipal League, Town and Country, July
17, 1995 (quoted in Van Dervort, supra note 7, at 63).
43 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 1.01.
44
Id at §§ 1.02 & 1.03.
45 Id at § 1.04. "In addition to its primary purpose of selfimprovement, the JPEP must provide information that will
enable the Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission to
perform objective evaluations and to issue fair and accurate
reports concerning each appellate judge's performance."
46 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. §17-4-201). The Tennessee Plan did not change the
method of election for Tennessee's trial judges; thus, JPE's
voter awareness goal affected only incumbent appellate
judges.
47 See Bopp, supra note 34, at 97 (stating that "[t]he
primary pitfall is that merit selection lacks any strong
accountability mechanism since retention elections are a
42
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Tennessee's JPE not only met, but exceeded the
49
recommended standards for judicial evaluation programs.
The program had official statuso and was sanctioned by
both statute and Supreme Court Rule. 51 Despite this
linkage, JPE retained institutional independence from both
the legislature and the judiciary.5 2 The program's well-

&

weak substitute for popular elections."); Andersen, supra
note 35, at 1377 (noting that "[r]etention elections provide
accountability in theory, but in practice they can suffer
from the same lack of publicity and voter interest as
competitive judicial elections often do.").
48 Andersen, supra note 35, at 1389.
49 Generally, the ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 39, are
considered the model for judicial evaluation programs. For
a discussion of the specifics of effective evaluation
programs, see Andersen, supra note 35; see also Kevin M.
Esterling & Kathleen M. Sampson, Judicial Retention
Evaluation Programs in Four States - A Report with
Recommendations (1998), available at http://www.Judicial
selection.us/uploads/documents/ExecSummJudRetEva
1_4C67B5A81A9B3.pdf
50 Andersen, supra note 35, at 1376.
1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. §17-4-201 (1994)); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27.
52 See GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at
1-2 (noting that a
"judicial evaluation program should be structured and
implemented so as not to impair the independence of the
judiciary"); 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(a)(3) (1994) (providing that
information collected for purposes of evaluating judges
shall be confidential ); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 2.04 (stating
that the "Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission . ..
shall be considered independent of the Administrative
Office of the Courts"); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, §§ 6.02
6.03 (providing for limited disclosure of "[a]ll records and

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 343
defined goals and objectives
were broad and
54
comprehensive in scope, but the overarching program
objectives were complemented with precise rules and
d55
procedures.
Tennessee's JPE utilized professionally-designed
survey instruments to solicit views from a variety of court
users, including jurors, lawyers, litigants, and other judges.
But evaluation also took into account non-survey
information acquired through public comments, personal
interviews, observations, and caseload and workload
statistics. 56 The program evaluated judges based upon
"clear, measurable performance standards," 57 utilizing
questionnaires that assessed specific relevant criteria, such
as integrity, knowledge and understanding of the law,
ability to communicate, preparation and attentiveness,
service to the profession and the public, and effectiveness

information obtained and maintained by the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission concerning the
performance of individual judges"); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27,
§ 6.04 (providing that "all information, questionnaires,
notes, memoranda or data" shall be in admissible as
evidence and not discoverable in any action or by any
board or tribunal); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, § 6.05 (providing
for the destruction of records six months after a judge's
death or retirement).
53 GUIDELINES,
supra note 39, at 1-1; see text
accompanying notes 43-48 supra.
54 Andersen, supra note 35, at 1377-79.
TENN. SUP. CT. R. 27, §§ 4 & 5.
56 GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 4.1 - 4.3. See TENN. SUP.
CT. R. 27, §§ 5.02 & 5.04; Tennessee Appellate Judges
Evaluation Reports are presently available at http://www.ts
c. state.tn.us/boards-commissions/boards-commissions/judic
ial-performance-evaluation-commission.
Esterling & Sampson, supra note 49, at xix.
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in working with others.5 8 The final evaluation reports were
disseminated by print media 59 and, ultimately, were
available electronically, 60 allowing the public easy access
to the evaluation results and assuring that the results
provided a useful and meaningful voter information tool. 6 1
Tennessee's JPE was administered by the Judicial
Performance Evaluation Commission (hereafter JPEC),
comprised of lawyers, judges, and lay persons appointed by
various professional organizations and office holders. 6 2

GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 3-1 - 3-8; TENN. SUP. CT.
R. 27, § 3. I have previously discussed the relationship of
these performance criteria to the qualities of good judges.
See Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance
Evaluations to Supplement Inappropriate Voter Cues and
EnhanceJudicialLegitimacy, 74 Mo. L. REV. 635, 657-661
(2009).
59 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-201(c) (1994)).
60 See supra note 56.
61 As the Institute for the Advancement of the Legal System
has noted "[a] commitment to public judicial performance
evaluation involves a concomitant commitment to assuring
58

that the results are widely known . . ." INSTITUTE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMER. LEGAL Sys., TRANSPARENT
COURTHOUSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION 10 (2006), available at http://iaals.du.edu/ima
ges/wygwam/documents/publications/TCQ Blueprint JPE
2006.pdf) (hereafter "TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE").
62 GUIDELINES, supra note 39, at 2-2 & Commentary; 1994
Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §
17-4-201(b)(1)-(4) (1994) (providing that the Judicial
Council and the Speakers of the House and Senate would
appoint attorneys, judges, and non-attorneys to the JPEC).
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Commissioners' terms were staggered and limited. 63
Similarly, the JPEC's structure and composition mirrored
suggested standards.64
III. Tennessee's Model Judicial Selection, Evaluation,
and Retention System Worked
Thus, in 1994, Tennessee had a model and
respected judicial selection, evaluation, and retention
system for its appellate court judges. More importantly, the
system worked. It produced a highly qualified, diverse
appellate bench, whose members adjudicated cases both
fairly and efficiently. In short, the Tennessee judicial
selection, evaluation, and retention system was not broken.
A. Tennessee's judicial selection, evaluation, and
retention system met the goals set by the
legislature.
The respect for the Tennessee Plan was welldeserved. When the Plan was adopted, the General
Assembly outlined four specific and noble goals: selecting
the best qualified judges, bringing greater racial and gender
diversity to the bench, insulating judges from political
pressure and influence, and enhancing the prestige of and
65
public respect for the courts. Between 1994 and 2010, the
Tennessee Plan met each of these laudable goals.

Andersen, supra note 35, at 1383; 1994 Tenn.
Pub. Acts,
ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201 (b)(7)
(8) (1994).
64 TRANSPARENT COURTHOUSE, supra note 61, at 8.
65 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101 to 102) (2009).
&

63
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1. The Tennessee Plan produced
qualifed, diverse appellate bench.

a

highly

In a judicial selection system based on merit,
judicial vacancies are publicized. Applicants are required to
provide detailed information about their personal and
professional background, work experiences, education,
abilities, and achievements. After viewing these relevant
qualifications, a diverse selection commission nominates
the most qualified applicants to the appointing authority.
The Tennessee Plan embraced each of these important
-66
aspects of merit selection.
The clarity and pertinence of the selection process
attracted qualified applicants. In particular, those lacking
political connections 67 were still able to compete for a
See text accompanying supra notes 29-31.
67 I am well aware that many qualified applicants fell
victim to politics at its worst on occasion, when the JSC
"stacked the deck" with its nominees. In writing about the
design and potential of the Tennessee Plan and contrasting
its value relative to the value of our current system, I am
not suggesting that the Tennessee Plan always worked
perfectly or apolitically. One example of imperfect
operation occurred in 2006. The JSC submitted a slate of
three nominees to Governor Phil Bredesen to fill a vacancy
on the Tennessee Supreme Court. The slate included
Davidson County Chancellor Richard Dinkins, who is an
African American, and attorneys J. Houston Gordon and
George T. "Buck" Lewis. Chancellor Dinkins withdrew
from consideration, prompting the Governor to request a
new slate of nominees reflecting diversity, The JSC asked
the Governor to clarify his rejection and ultimately
submitted a second slate, which included J. Houston
Gordon and two others. The Governor then filed a
declaratory judgment action against the JSC alleging that
66
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nomination based on their qualifications.68 Knowing that
the JSC was largely comprised of experienced lawyers who
knew the essential qualities of a good judge encouraged
qualified candidates who possessed the necessary intellect,
temperament, and judgment to serve. Additionally, those
experienced lawyer JSC members were well-positioned to
evaluate and predict suitability for the bench.
Admittedly, determining the quality of an appellate
judge is no easy task. An appellate court's caseload is
predominantly determined by litigants and their lawyers,
not the judges.69 But one measurement of appellate
efficiency is the length of time it takes an appellate court to

the second slate was invalid because it included a
previously rejected nominee. Gordon and Lewis were
allowed to intervene in the lawsuit.
Following trial
proceedings, and pursuant to its reach-down prerogative,
the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the JSC could
not include on a subsequent slate of nominees an individual
who had been included on a rejected slate. Bredesen v.
Tennessee Judicial Selection Commission, 214 S.W.3d 419
(Tenn. 2007).
68 While measuring whether merit selection systems in and
of themselves produce more qualified judges is a difficult
proposition, studies uniformly show meaningful differences
between appointed and elected judges.
69 Parties have an automatic right to appeal trial court
decisions to the Tennessee Court of Appeals and the
Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Only the Tennessee
Supreme Court has "control" over the size of its docket
because its appellate jurisdiction is largely discretionary,
but even the Supreme Court is required to hear certain
kinds of cases. See generally TENN. R. App. 9-12 (outlining
the methods of appeal in Tennessee); TENN. CODE ANN. §
39-13-206 (2014 Repl.) (establishing the Supreme Court's
mandatory review of capital cases).
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conclude a case after the case is heard. This measurement is
sometimes referred to as the case-disposition or clearance
rate. National organizations have promoted time guidelines
to encourage the expeditious disposition of cases.
Tennessee appellate courts have long adhered to case
processing
deadlines,
have a clear enforcement
mechanism, and regularly have impressive case-clearance
rates.7 2
In addition to evaluations based on a courts'
clearance rate, some nonprofit organizations evaluate state
appellate courts based on other factors, usually reflective of
the groups' ideology. One example is an evaluation
conducted by the Center for Public Integrity,7 3 Global
The American Bar Association and the National Center
for State Courts, for example, have promoted time
standards for appellate courts. See National Center for
State Courts, Appellate Court Performance Measures
(2011), available at http://www.courtools.org/-/media/Mic
rosites/Files/CourTools/courtools_appellate measure2_Tim
eTo Disposition.ashx.
n TENN. SUP. CT. R. 11 (setting out mechanism for
collecting court statistics, deadlines for rendering decisions,
and procedure for prompting a dilatory judge).
72 The annual statistics for Tennessee's appellate courts are
compiled in annual reports, which are posted on the website
for the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts. The
most recent annual report, covering fiscal year 2012-13,
may be viewed at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/fil
es/docs/annual_report fy2013.pdf In 2012-13, during a
time of upheaval and uncertainty about the tenure of
appellate judges, Tennessee's appellate courts averaged a
clearance rate that exceeded 100 percent.
73 The Center for Public Integrity, according to its website,
is a nonpartisan, nonprofit investigative news organization
whose mission is to "serve democracy by revealing abuses
70
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.

Integrity,7 4 and Public Radio International 2 5 which ranked
the integrity of state institutions based upon their
transparency, accountability, and corruption risk. 76
Although the state of Tennessee fared poorly overall, the
score received for judicial accountability was among the
state's highest score and ranked Tennessee favorably based
upon the transparency of judicial selection, the integrity of
the judiciary, and the accountability of judges for their
-77
actions

of power, corruption and betrayal of public trust by
powerful public and private institutions, using the tools of
investigative journalism." http://www.publicintegrity.org/.
74 According to its website, Global Integrity "champions
transparent and accountable government around the world
by producing innovative research and technologies that
inform, connect, and empower civic, private, and public
reformers seeking more open societies." https://www.globa
lintegrity.org/about/mission/.
75 Public Radio International is a global nonprofit media
company whose mission is to "serve audiences as a
distinctive content source for information, insights and
cultural experiences essential to living in our diverse,
interconnected world." http://www.pri.org/about-pri.
76 Tennessee's corruption risk report card can be viewed at
http://www.stateintegrity.org/tennessee.
77 Tennessee's judicial accountability report can be viewed
at http://www.stateintegrity.org/tennesseesurveyjudicial_
accountability. At the other extreme, it may be worth
noting that the Tennessee court system has never made the
list of so-called "judicial hellholes," catalogued by the
American Tort Reform Foundation in annual reports.
According to its website, the American Tort Reform
Foundation (ATRF) is a nonprofit corporation whose
primary purpose is to "educate the general public about
how the American civil justice system operates; the role of
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In addition to producing a highly qualified and
effective appellate bench, the Tennessee Plan produced a
significantly more diverse appellate bench.78 The increase
in diversity under the Tennessee Plan was consistent with
the findings of national studies showing that racial and
gender diversity is more likely to occur through an
appointed system7 9 and that women are significantly more
likely to be appointed, rather than elected, to state supreme
courts. 8o
Under the Tennessee Plan, membership on the JSC
was required to reflect the state's diversity; the Speakers
were required to reject nomination lists that did not reflect
diversity. 81 The presence of a diverse selection body
encouraged more diversity among applicants and ultimately
enhanced the likelihood that minority candidates and
women would be appointed. 8 2 Although the number of

tort law in the civil justice system; and the impact of tort
law on the private, public and business sectors of society."
available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/about/. The
ATRF defines judicial hellholes as "places where judges
systematically apply laws and court procedures in an unfair
and unbalanced manner, generally against defendants in
civil lawsuits." Id
78 See TENN. SEC'Y OF STATE, TENNESSEE BLUE BOOK
(1994-2014).
79 Lisa
M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court
Diversification: Staffing the State Courts of Last Resort
through InterimAppointments, 27 JUST. SYs. J. 1, 7 (2006)
80 Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity
and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment
Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme
Courts, 83 Soc. SCI. Q. 504, 504 (2002).
81 See supra notes 29-30.
82 Research supports the conclusion that
demographically
diverse nominating commissions attract more diverse
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racial minorities serving as appellate judges in Tennessee
remains distressingly low, the number more than tripled
under the Tennessee Plan.83 Similarly, Tennessee's female
appellate judges increased nearly ten-fold. 84 Thus, the
Tennessee Plan yielded the state's most diverse appellate
judiciary, clearly advancing the legislature's stated purpose
of bringing more racial and gender diversity to the bench.85

candidates and select more diverse nominees. Kevin M.
Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial
Merit Selection Process:A StatisticalReport in RESEARCH
ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 1999 (American Judicature Society
2000 ed.).
83 See Margaret L.
Behm & Candi Henry, Judicial
Selection in Tennessee: Deciding the Decider, 1 BELMONT
L. REv. 143,176 (2014) (stating that in 23 years under the
Tennessee Plan, "appointments through April 2013 were
sixty-nine percent men and thirty-one percent women.
Nine percent of those appointed were members of minority
groups.") These totals include trial and appellate level
appointments.
84 In 1992, Tennessee had two female appellate judges.
Eight additional women have been appointed to the
appellate bench since 1992. See supra note 78. Prior to
1996, the Tennessee Supreme Court had never had more
than a single female member; since 2008, it has had three
female members, making it one of four states with a
majority of women on its highest court. The others three
Wisconsin.
Ohio,
and
are
North
Carolina,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/bench-di
versity/index. cfm?state).

1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at
ANN. § 17-4-101 to 102) (1994).
85

TENN. CODE
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2. The Tennessee Plan insulated judges from
political pressure and thereby enhanced the
prestige of and public respect for the courts.
After the Tennessee Plan became fully operational
in 1998, forty-one appellate judges were evaluated and
subsequently retained in office in the years 2000, 2006,
86
2008, 2010, and 2012. During a decade in which spending
in judicial races skyrocketed and special interest groups
battered judicial
candidates with negative, nasty
campaigns,
no Tennessee judge was targeted for

86

See generally http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/boards-commiss

ions/boards-commissions/judicial-performance-evaluationcommission. In 1998, Chief Justice Adolpho Birch, Jr., was
retained on the Tennessee Supreme Court, but the
Commission's webpage does not include his evaluation.
Although the Tennessee Plan was operational at the time, I
have been unable to determine whether the JPC evaluated
or disseminated Chief Justice Birch's evaluation. In 2000,
5 judges were evaluated and retained; in 2006, 27 judges
were evaluated and retained; in 2008, 5 judges were
evaluated and retained; and in both 2010 and 2012, 2
judges were evaluated and retained.
87 Since 2000, the Brennan Center for Justice has produced
annual reports that catalogue the trends in judicial
elections. The reports are available on the Center's website
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/resources/the-new-politicsof-judicial-elections/. The 2000-2009 report summarizes
the trend: Campaign fundraising more than doubled, from
$83.3 million in 1990-1999 to $206.9 million in 20002009. Three of the last five Supreme Court election cycles
topped $45 million. All but two of the 22 states with
contestable Supreme Court elections had their costliest-ever
contests inthe 2000-2009 decade. Available at http://www.j
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opposition or required to raise more than nominal campaign
funds. The unique evaluation component of the Tennessee
Plan provided voters with pertinent, apolitical information
about the judges, filling the vacuum often occupied by
special interest groups' misleading campaign ads. 8
Tennessee's appellate bench avoided the trend that plagued
so many state judiciaries and remained largely insulated
from political pressure. As studies show, a fortunate by
product of apolitical courts is enhanced public respect for
the judiciary.89
3. The
Tennessee
Plan
gave
meaningful
information to allow voters to cast informed
ballots in retention races.
Beginning in 2000, 90 the JEC evaluated every
appellate judge who sought election to fill either an
unexpired or full term. 91 In evaluating each judge, the JEC
considered the application submitted by the judge to the
JSC; the judge's self-report form and formal interview with
the JEC; the results of survey questionnaires; the judge's
caseload and workload statistics; and public input. The

usticeatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecadeONLINE_8E
7FD3FEB83E3.pdf
8 See White, supra note 58 (discussing how relevant
evaluation information replaces irrelevant campaign
advertising as meaningful voter cues).
89 The Brennan Center's 2000-2009 summary report on
pages 77-87 cites numerous studies on these issues.
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/JASNPJEDecade
ONLINE_8E7FD3FEB83E3.pdf.
90 See supra note 86.
91 The reports
are available on the website of the
Administrative Office of the Courts at www.tsc.state.tn.us/s
ites/default/files/docs/judeval.pdf.
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final evaluation was based on criteria pertinent to the task
of judging and included an assessment of the judge's
integrity; knowledge and understanding of the law; ability
to communicate; preparation and attentiveness; service to
the profession; and effectiveness in working with other
judges and with court personnel.9 2 The evaluation report
included a summary of the judge's legal education,
experience, and service to the profession; the survey
results; the JEC's impressions of the judge's experience
and performance; the JEC's recommendation regarding
retention; and, if desired, the judge's written response.93
The evaluation report was published in newspapers and
made available on the Administrative Office of the Courts
website, accomplishing the legislature's stated purpose of
promoting "informed retention decisions" and assuring a
"responsive" appellate judiciary.9 4
IV.

The Dismantling of Tennessee's Model Judicial
Selection, Evaluation, and Retention System-a/k/a
They Broke It.

A. Introduction
Through a series of calculated legislative actions,
the Tennessee General Assembly dismantled Tennessee's
unique judicial selection, evaluation, and retention system
and replaced the system with one that is dominated by and
dependent upon the legislature. Tennessee's 2 1st century
judiciary is reminiscent of its 1 8 th century judiciary, 9 5
92

TENN. SUP.

Ct. R. 27.
93 See supra note 86.
94 See text accompanying supra notes 43, 45.
95 TENN. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1796) (giving legislature the
power to determine whether to create courts); TENN.
CONST. art. V, § 2 (1796) (giving legislature the power to
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controlled by the legislative branch and susceptible to the
corruption that accompanies the "concentrating [of all
government power] in the same hands." 9 6 The modification
and repeal of statutes outlining the mechanisms for judicial
selection, evaluation, and retention spawned the adoption
of a constitutional amendment that ultimately retains
gubernatorial appointment and retention elections for
appellate judges, but critically alters the judicial selection
system and entirely removes the system for judicial
performance evaluation. By eliminating two of the three
essential components of the Tennessee Plan, the legislature
has produced a judicial system accountable only to
politicians.
The adoption of the constitutional amendment
replacing Tennessee's judicial selection, evaluation, and
retention system was preceded by a clever, if disingenuous
campaign. Backing the amendment was an impressive array
of former and current governors, legislators, judges, and
popular citizens. They argued that Tennesseans were
limited to two choices. They could adopt the amendment
and preserve retention elections (albeit by placing the
courts under legislative control), or they could submit the
courts to partisan elections. The far better choiceretaining the Tennessee Plan with its unique selection and
evaluation components-was clouded with the persistent,
yet preposterous claim 97 that the Plan, adopted by the

elect judges); TENN. CONST. art. IV (giving legislature the
power to impeach judges); TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 3
(giving legislature the power to elect judges); TENN.
CONST. art. VI, § 6 (1834) (giving legislature the power to
impeach judges).
96 See supra note 3.
97 Courts consistently have upheld the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Plan. The predecessor to the 1994 Tennessee
Plan was upheld in State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496
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legislature and utilized to appoint every appellate judge in
the last twenty years, was unconstitutional. 98
B. The Beginning of the End of the Tennessee Plan
That Tennessee's unique judicial
selection,
evaluation and retention system was in danger of being
dismantled became readily apparent in early 2008.
Although the legislature had tinkered with the size and
composition of the JSC and the JEC in 2001,99 a more

&

S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973). The 1994 Plan was upheld in
State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn.
1996) and Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409 (Tenn.
2014). Other cases endorsing the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan include Hooker v. Andersen, 12 Fed. Appx.
323 ( 6 th Cir. 2001); Hooker v. All Members of Tenn.
Supreme Court, No. 3-02-0787 (M.D. Tenn. July 28, 2003);
Johnson v. Bredesen, 356 Fed. Appx. 781 ( 6 th Cir. 2009);
and Delaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998).
98 The basis for my characterization of the constitutional
challenge to the Tennessee Plan as preposterous is detailed
elsewhere and will not be repeated here. See White
Reddick, supra note 25; see also Behm, supra note 83.
99 In 2001, the General Assembly increased the size of the
JSC from 15-17 members. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 459
(codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a) (2001)).
More important than the increase in size, however, was the
implicit change in mindset concerning who should vet
judicial candidates. The two new members of the JSC were
required to be lawyers, but the Speakers were not required
to receive input or recommendations from bar
organizations. 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 459 (codified at
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(b) (2001)). By removing the
organized bar, the legislature began to assert greater control
over the judicial selection process. As discussed at text
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pervasive threat arose in 2008 by the operation of
Review
Law
Entity
Governmental
Tennessee's
("TGERL").10 0 This law provides for the periodic review of
all state government entities "to ensure that regulation was
beneficial rather than detrimental to the public interest."10 1
A legislative committee evaluates the "quality, efficiency,
and success of [governmental entities and] programs"102 in
light of legislative mandates and recommends continuation
of "successful and efficient entities that are beneficial to the
citizens" and elimination of inactive, duplicative, and
"ineffective, inefficient, unnecessary or undesirable
entities." 10 3 Following this so-called "sunset review," the
committee proposes legislation to terminate or continue
entities.104 A terminated entity has one year to wind up its
affairs, before it permanently expires.10 5

accompany infra notes 124-126, the General Assembly
completed the removal of lawyers from the selection
process in 2009 when it eliminated altogether the
requirement that the Speakers appoint JSC members from
lists provided by bar organizations. 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts,
ch. 517 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a)&(b)
(2009)).
100 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-101, -236 (2011 Repl.) (as
amended).
101

§ 4-29-102(a) (2011 Repl.) (as

TENN. CODE ANN.

amended).
102

§ 4-29-105(1) (2011 Repl.) (as

TENN. CODE ANN.

amended).
103

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§ 4-29-105(2)-(5) (2011 Repl.) (as

amended).
104

TENN. CODE ANN.

§§

4-29-107, -108 (2011 Repl.) (as

amended).

§

4-29-112 (2011 Repl.) (as
amended). This process is referred to both as winding up
the affairs and winding down the entity. Compare id. with
1o5

TENN.

CODE ANN.
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Both the JSC and JEC were scheduled to terminate
under the terms of the TGERL in 2008. Although the
process of sunset review was routine and ordinary, the
circumstances surrounding the sunset review and
subsequent winding-up of the affairs of the JSC and JEC
were anything but conventional.
When the General Assembly adjourned on May 21,
2008, without providing for the continued existence of the
JSC and JEC, 1 0 6 the two Commissions terminated1 0 7 and
began the one-year wind-up, setting the course for both to
expire completely on June 30, 2009. l0s Although this
situation was troubling, no appellate judges were on the
August 2008 ballot for retention, so the failure to provide
for the continued existence of the JSC and JEC did not
create an immediate crisis. Presumably, the General
Assembly would address the issue when it reconvened in
January 2009.
During the 2009 legislative session, numerous bills
were introduced in reaction to the scheduled expiration of

Tn. Att'y Gen. Op. 09-43, 2009 WL 837837 (March 26,
2009). The term "terminate" refers to the date on which the
entity sunsets and the term "expire" refers to the date one
year later, after the entity's wind-up year. The term
"sunset" and "terminate" are used interchangeably here.
Thus, an entity terminates (or sunsets), winds up, and then,
expires.
106 A number of statutes designate the sunset date for
various governmental entities, but the legislature routinely
repeals or transfers subsections of the statutes, which has
the effect of changing the date of the entity's termination
and expiration. See generally TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29230, 238 (2011 Repl. & 2014 Supp.)
107

TENN. CODE ANN.

Repl.) (as amended).
los Id

§§ 4-29-229(a)(46) & (47) (2011
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the JSC and the JEC. Some bills proposed partisan
elections, while others altered the existing retention system.
None of the judicial selection proposals included the unique
selection and evaluation components of the existing
Tennessee Plan. Ultimately, the 1 0 6th General Assembly
failed to adopt a new judicial selection system; however,
the overall tenor of the proposals and debate suggested that
the legislature intended to allow the permanent expiration
of the JSC and the JEC the following year.109
By early 2009 concern about the effect of the
permanent expiration of the JSC and JEC was mounting.
Leaders in the Senate and House asked the Attorney
General to offer an opinion on the legal effect of the
expiration of the JSC and JEC. That opinion, released in
late March of 2009, advised that if both Commissions
permanently expired, no appellate judges could be elected
in either 2010 (when two appellate judges were scheduled
to be on the ballot)11 0 or in 2014 (when all twenty-nine
appellate judges would be on the ballot seeking retention
for a new eight-year term)."' Additionally, no vacancies in
appellate judgeships occurring after July 1, 2009, the final
wind-up date for both Commissions, could be filled. 1 12
Perhaps the Attorney General's Opinion prompted
the legislature's next step. A few days before adjourning
the 2009 session, the legislature passed comprehensive
legislation that altered many aspects of the Tennessee

109 See generally H.B. 0173, 0958, 1017, 1 0 7th Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012).
110 Chief Justice Sharon Lee and Court of Appeals Judge
John W. McClarty were both scheduled for retention votes
on August 5, 2010.
I Tn. Att'y Gen. Op. 09-43, 2009 WL 837837 (March 26,
2009).
112 id
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Plan. 1 1 3 In the abstract, the 2009 Act seemed peculiar, but
when viewed with the advantage of time and perspective,
the 2009 legislation was obviously the beginning of the end
of the Tennessee Plan. The new legislation signaled a
fundamental shift in the legislature's attitude toward the
courts.
C. The 2009 Legislation
This fundamental shift was evident from the
opening sentences of the 2009 legislation. There, the
General Assembly modified its statement of legislative
purpose, likely revealing more than it intended and
exposing a new view of the role of the courts. This revision
in the underlying purpose of the Tennessee Plan now seems
prescient. 114 Whereas, the original purpose of the
Tennessee Plan was to "insulate the judges . . . from
political influence and pressure [and to] eliminate[e] the
necessity of political activities," in order to make the courts
"nonpolitical," 115 the General Assembly's newly stated
purpose dismissed the importance of an apolitical judiciary.
Now, the purpose underlying judicial selection was not to
totally remove judges from politics, but only to "[b]etter"
insulate judges, to minimize, but not eliminate political
activity, and to make the courts only "less political." 1 16
In harmony with this more political view of judicial
selection and retention, the General Assembly also
modified the ballot language for retention elections in

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. §§17-4-101 to 108) (2009).
1 14
See Appendix 1.
11 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE
113

ANN.
116

§ 17-4-101(a) (1994)).

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE

ANN.

§ 17-4-101(a) (2009)).
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2009.
As was true in other retention states, Tennessee
voters previously responded "yes" or "no" to the question
whether a judge "should be elected and retained in office,"
but the new ballot language required voters to choose "to
retain" or "to replace" the judge.1 18 The JEC, renamed the
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission (JPEC), 119
would now recommend judges for retention or replacement,
rather than recommending for or against retention.120
The 2009 legislation included many changes to the
selection process that were consistent with this jaded view
of the courts. For example, when the Tennessee Plan was
adopted, the advice and counsel of lawyers concerning
judicial selection was viewed as essential to the mission of
"finding and appointing the best qualified persons available
for service." 1 2 1 Specifically, the legislature noted that due
to their "experience and observation," lawyers were
"familiar with the best qualities and characteristics of
judges." 122 To capitalize on this legal expertise,
membership on the JSC and the JEC consisted largely of

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-114(b)(1) (2009)).
1 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-114(b)(1) (2009)).
119 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-115(b)(2) (2009)).
120 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4 -115(b)(1) (2009)). If a judge was not retained,
the statute allowed the governor to bypass the appointment
process and fill the vacancy by direct appointment. 2009
Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. §
17-4-113 (2009)).
121 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(a) (2009)).
122 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(b) (2009)).
1
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lawyers,
nominated
by
four
state-wide
lawyer
organizations.123 But in 2009, along with the change in the
name of both Commissions, 12 4 the legislature changed the
selection process for Commission members, giving the
Speakers of the Senate and the House the exclusive power
to appoint the members of both Commissions. 125 The
previous provisions requiring the Speakers to appoint from
a list of lawyers submitted by bar organizations was
deleted. 126

2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-102(a)(1)-(4) (2009) (requiring nominees for
the JSC to be submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association,
the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, the Tennessee
District Attorney General Conference, and the Tennessee
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers)); 2009 Tenn.
Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4201(b) (2009) (requiring selection of commission members
from lists submitted by bar groups); 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts,
ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (2009)
(requiring that the JEC consist of members appointed from
lists submitted by the bar groups).
124 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-102(a) (2009) (changing the name of the
Judicial Selection Commission to the Judicial Nominating
Commission); 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending
TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-201(b) (changing the name of the
Judicial Evaluation Commission and program to the
Judicial
Performance Evaluation
Commission and
program).
125 See supra note 99 for details concerning an earlier
change in the provisions related to Commission members.
126 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-201(b)(6) (2009) (noting that "[i]n appointing
attorneys to the commission, the speakers shall receive, but
123
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The 2009 legislation also omitted another
significant provision relevant to the composition of the
Commissions - the provision that required the Speakers to
reject entire lists of nominees that did not "reflect the
diversity of the state's population." 12 7 Coupled with the
deletion of that diversity initiative was the relaxation of
another provision also aimed at assuring diversity. Under
the original statute creating the Tennessee Plan, the
Speakers were required to appoint commission members
"who approximate the population of the state with respect
to race, including the dominant ethnic minority population,
and gender." 12 8 This provision was replaced with one that
required only that the Speakers make appointments with a
"conscious intention of selecting a body that reflects
diversity." 1 2 9 Only geographic diversity was still required.

shall not be bound by, recommendations from any
interested person or organization").
127 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(b)(2) (2009)). The 1994 Act provided,
"[i]f the nominees do not reflect the diversity of the state's
population, the speaker shall reject the entire list of a group
and require the group to resubmit its nominees." 1994

Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §
17-4-101(b)(2) (1994) (emphasis added). To effectuate this
requirement, the groups were required to "include
background data" about each nominee. 1994 Tenn. Pub.
Acts, ch. 942 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-101(c)
(1994). This provision was also eliminated in 2009.
128 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(b)(3) (2009)).
129 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-101(c) (2009)). In addition to race and gender,
the Speakers were required to make appointments with a
"conscious intention of selecting a body that" represented
"rural as well as urban centers."
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The Speakers were required to appoint at least four
Commissioners, and were prohibited from appointing more
than seven from the same grand division of the state. 1 3 0
The changes in the composition and role of the JSC,
now called the Judicial Nominating Commission (INC),
mirrored the changes in the composition and role of the
JEC, now the JPEC. Judicial evaluation had not been a
simple sell in Tennessee. Judges were resistant to the new
idea initially, but were consoled, perhaps, by the fact that
judges, who were familiar with the tasks of judging and the
essential qualities of good judges, were involved in each
step of the process-from designing and refining the
evaluation system to actually participating in the
evaluations.
When JPE was initially adopted, the Supreme Court
retained authority over the details of the program. The
original JPC, for example, included twelve members, six of
whom were judges appointed by the Judicial Council
(JC).131 But in 2009, the same year the JC was scheduled to
2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-102(a)(1)-(2), (4) (2009)).
131 Since its creation in 1943, the Judicial
Council had
made recommendations to the General Assembly "for
changes in rules, procedures or methods of administration,
or upon any other matter pertaining to the judicial system."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-21-107(a)(2) (2014 Supp.) Each
year the Judicial Council made an annual state of the
judiciary report to the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches; made recommendations about legislation
affecting the judiciary; and assisted in allocating and
reallocating
scarce
judicial
resources.
Id.
at
107(a)(3)(A)&(B) (2014 Supp.) (noting Judicial Council's
duty to report annually and to recommend "creation or
reallocation" of judicial, prosecutorial, and public defender
positions). The Judicial Council expired on June 30, 2009,
130
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expire, the membership of the JPEC decreased to nine
members, with the JC's appointing authority cut in half 132
A year later, after the JC had terminated and was winding
up its affairs, the General Assembly eliminated input from
the Judicial Council, assumed the role of appointing all of
the members of the JPEC, and again, decreased the number
of judges on the JPEC, this time from five to three. 1 3 3 The
2009 legislation advanced politics as the core component of
judicial selection and evaluation, greatly decreased the
opportunity for input from the legal profession, and
removed entirely diversity requirements.
Initially, perhaps because both the JSC and JEC
were replaced with different but similar Commissions that
began their operations immediately, the actual termination
of the JSC and the JEC on June 30, 2009 seemed
innocuous. Revealing in hindsight was the short life given
to both of the replacement Commissions. Both the JNC and
the JPEC were scheduled to sunset a mere two years after
their creation, on June 30, 2012.134
With the new statutory mechanism in place, two
appellate judges, who were appointed to fill unexpired
terms, filed qualifying petitions to seek retention in the
August 5, 2010, election. 13 5 The new JPEC evaluated the

and terminated completely following its wind-up on June
30, 2010. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-29-230(a)(32) (2011 Repl.)
132 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. §17-4-201(b)(1) (2009)).
133 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 517 (amending TENN. CODE
ANN. § 17-4-114(b)(1) (2009)).
134 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-233(a)(15) & (16) (2011
Repl.)
135 The two judges were Justice Sharon
G. Lee, appointed
to the Tennessee Supreme Court in October 2008, and
Judge John Westley McClarty, appointed to the Tennessee
Court of Appeals in January 2009.
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judges and reported its findings to the general public as
required by law. 13 6 The voters in the 2010 election applied
the new ballot language and overwhelmingly voted to
retain, rather than replace, the two appellate judges. 1 3 7 The
looming crisis, foreshadowed by the Attorney General's
2009 opinion, had been avoided for at least temporarily.
Between 2009 and 2012, the INC nominated
candidates and the Governor filled four judicial vacancies
with three men and one woman, all of whom would join
other incumbent judges to stand for retention election in
August 2010.138
D. The End of the Tennessee Plan and the Adoption
of Amendment Two
Meanwhile, however, the General Assembly
continued to flirt with various proposals that offered
additional revisions to Tennessee's system. A potpourri of
options were proposed, but none passed, leaving the 2009
Act virtually intact. While the JNC and JPEC had
continued to operate, both were nearing their impending
sunset dates. In 2012, days before adjournment, the General
Assembly pardoned the JPEC, extending its life for an
additional year. 13 9 This meant that the JPEC would expire
The 2010 report is available at http://www.tsc.state.tn.us
/sites/default/files/docs/jpec_evaluations_2010.pdf.
137 The election results are available at
http://www.tn.gov/s
os/election/results/2010-08/CCState%/`20General.pdf.
138 In 2010 Justice Sharon Lee was appointed to the
Tennessee Supreme Court; her seat on the Court of Appeals
was filled by Judge John McClarty. In 2012 Judge (now
Justice) Jeffrey Bivins and Judge Roger Page were named
to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.
139 TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4-29-333(a)(16); TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 4-29-334(37) (2014 Repl.).
136
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on June 30, 2012, and terminate completely on June 30,
2013, approximately five weeks before the 2014 election.
The legislature offered no similar reprieve for the JNC,
allowing it to expire on June 30, 2012. But before
adjournment, the legislature approved Senate Joint
Resolution (SJR) 710, filed just three weeks earlier.
SIR 710, which would come to be known as
"Amendment 2," 140 proposed an amendment to Article VI,
Section 3 of the Tennessee Constitution. Article VI, Section
2 provided for the selection of Tennessee's Supreme Court
justices by the "qualified voters of the State." 14 1 Pursuant to
its legislative power, the legislature had adopted the
Tennessee Plan as the means of judicial selection in 1994;
now the legislature was proposing an amendment that
would replace Tennessee's model selection, evaluation, and
retention system with a gubernatorial appointmentlegislative confirmation judicial selection system.
In Tennessee, proposed constitutional amendments
must be approved by increasing majorities of both houses
in two consecutive General Assemblies before being placed
on the ballot during a gubernatorial election.142 SJR 710
swiftly passed both the House and the Senate and was
signed by both Speakers on April 30, 2012, one day before
the adjournment of the 1 0 7 th Session of the General
Assembly. 143
This designation was as a result of its being the second
of four constitutional amendments which ultimately were
placed before the Tennessee voters in November 2014.
140

141 TENN. CONST. art. VI,

§

142 TENN. CONST. art. XI,

3.

§ 3; see State ex rel. Cohen v.

Darnell, 885 S.W.2d 61 (Tenn. 1994) (noting that
amendment procedure was added to the 1834 Constitution
and has remained essentially the same since enactment in
1835).
143 See Appendix 1; infra
note 174
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The legislature's swift action on SIR 701 made it
clear why the JPEC was given another year of operation
and the INC was not. The legislature intended to complete
the elimination of the Tennessee Plan. By allowing the
statutory selection mechanism to terminate, the legislature
created its own calamity. Because Tennessee had no
judicial selection or appointment mechanism after the INC
terminated, it was unclear how judges who retired or died
after 2012 would be replaced. Additionally, the August
2014 retention election (at which time all appellate judges
would be on the ballot) was a mere two years away. Each
judge had to be evaluated by the JPEC before the election.
While the JPEC could do preliminary evaluations for the
judges standing for retention, it too was set to terminate
completely before the August 2014 election. Even
presuming completion of the evaluation reports, no
mechanism existed for filling the seats of those judges who
were not retained.
This time it was the Governor's office that asked
the Attorney General for advice. Did the Governor retain
authority to appoint judges now that the JNC no longer
existed to provide the list of nominees to the Governor?
Ironically, and almost certainly unintentionally, the General
Assembly had provided an easy answer in a provision of
the 2009 legislation. A "failsafe" provision, not a part of
the original Tennessee Plan but included in the 2009
revisions, gave the Governor the power of appointment
notwithstanding the demise of the INC. 14 4
The failsafe provision, codified in Tennessee Code
Annotated Section 17-4-113(a), was included to assure that
a judicial vacancy did not linger due to the failure of the
INC to act in a timely manner. The provision authorized
the Governor to fill vacancies after 60 days if the JNC

Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. 13-76, 2013 WL 5669872 (Oct. 9,
2013).
144
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failed to provide a list of nominees within that time
period. 14 5 Although the INC no longer existed, the Attorney
General concluded that the failsafe provision "evidenced a
separate intent to ensure that judicial vacancies are filled in
a timely manner and recognized that the need for a
functioning judiciary carries a greater priority than the
JNC's advisory role." 1 4 6 Thus, the statute "empower[ed]
the Governor to fill judicial vacancies in all circumstances
in which the INC fails to act, including when the INC has
been terminated and therefore cannot act."147 As a result,
the Governor retained the statutory authority to fill judicial
vacancies even after the INC ceased to exist.148
Within a week of the Attorney General's opinion
confirming the Governor's power, the Governor signed an
Executive Order that distributed his power in a fashion
similar to what had existed prior to the JNC's termination.
In Executive Order 34, the Governor validated the role that
lawyers had played in the judicial selection process over
the last forty years1 4 9 and emphasized the importance of the
division of power between the branches of government. 1o
To assist in the judicial appointment process, the Governor

145

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 17-4-113(a) (2009 Repl.).

146 Tenn. Att'y Gen. Op. 13-76, 2013 WL 5669872, *3
(Oct. 9, 2013).
147 I at *4.
148 M at *5.
149 Exec. Order No. 34 (Oct. 16, 2013), available at
https://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam
34.pdf.) (noting that "for over forty years, Governors of the
State of Tennessee have been assisted in their search for
highly qualified judicial nominees by a commission
composed of distinguished attorneys and laypersons").
150 Id
(noting in the preamble that the Executive Order's
purpose includes "sustain[ing] the third and equal branch of
government and its continued operation").
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appointed a new Commission, the Governor's Commission
for Judicial Appointments (CJA), to "select" and "certify"
the names of the three persons deemed "best and most
qualified" to fill a judicial vacancy.
Existing JNC
members were appointed to serve on the CJA, along with
six additional members. Executive Order 34 detailed the
process that the CJA would follow in making its
recommendations to the Governor, 152 as well as the process
the Governor would follow in making the appointment. 1 5 3
A subsequent Executive Order, No. 38, amended Executive
Order 34 with regard to particularized circumstances. 1 5 4
Executive Order 34 is commendable in its
establishment of a transparent and orderly judicial selection
process. The process was followed in the appointment of
four appellate judges and numerous trial judges after the
expiration of the JNC. 15 But any executive order is
potentially fleeting. An executive order exists at the whim
and with the mercy of the executive. Even with its positive
aspects, Executive Order 34 left much uncertainty as to the
future of Tennessee's judicial selection process.
When the 108th General Assembly convened in
January 2014-the first General Assembly in decades to
include a Republican supermajority-many hoped that the
15 1

d. at 4(j).
Id. at (3), (4).
153
Id. at (5).
154 Exec. Order No. 38 (June 9, 2014) (providing for
appointment without CJA nomination when trial court
candidates, running for a vacated seat, have won primary
elections and have no opposition in the general election and
providing that the Governor may request the CJA to assist
in filling vacancies on the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board), available at http://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/
exec-orders-haslam38.pdf.
155 See Appendix 1. But see text following
note 171 infra.
152
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legislature would debate and adopt a more permanent
selection process for Tennessee's judges, but other than
approving the second resolution (SJR 2) necessary to place
Amendment 2 on the November 14 ballot, the legislature
took no other action related to the selection, evaluation, or
retention of Tennessee's judges. 1 5 6 This meant that most of
the details about how Amendment 2's so-called Founding
Father's Plan would work remained unknown. Amendment
2 clearly provided that judges would be appointed by the
Governor, confirmed by the legislature, and retained by the
voters,15 7 but the remaining details of the selection and

Senate Joint Resolution 2. As required by Article XI,
Section 3, SIR 2 was the second resolution "entered" on the
House and Senate journals. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
156

157

The Amendment provided:
Judges of the Supreme Court
or any intermediate appellate
court shall be appointed for a
full term or to fill a vacancy
by and at the discretion of the
governor; shall be confirmed
by the Legislature;
and
thereafter, shall be elected in
a retention election by the
qualified voters of the state.
Confirmation
by
default
occurs if the Legislature fails
to reject an appointee within
sixty calendar days of either
the date of appointment, if
made during the annual
legislative session, or the
convening date of the next
annual legislative session, if
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retention system was left entirely to legislative discretion
by the amendment's provision that the authorized the
legislature was authorized to "prescribe [the necessary]
provisions" to carry out the amendment.
But when the time came for the vote on
Amendment 2, the legislature had not proscribed any
provisions. No proposals set out the specifics of the
selection and confirmation process; no legislative study
group was tasked with seeking input or vetting options.
Voters who went to the polls in November 2014 were being
asked to give the legislature a proverbial blank check.
Among the blanks that the legislature had not filled
were the particulars of the legislative confirmation process.
For example, what percentages were required for the
legislature to confirm a governor's judicial appointment?
Would a simple majority of both houses confirm an
appointment? What process would be followed if a
nominee failed to acquire the required percentage in one
house or both houses? Similar uncertainty remained about
the public's retention vote. Would judges be retained in
office if a majority of the voters cast "retain" votes, or
would the legislature ultimately require a higher
percentage, as some members had proposed in earlier
legislation? Although Tennessee, and most retention states,
generally required a simple majority for retention, the

made out of session. The
Legislature is authorized to
prescribe such provisions as
may be necessary to carry out
Sections two and three of this
article.
TENN. CONST. art. VI, Section 3 (2014).
15 8

id
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amendment arguably gave the legislature the authority to
decide that issue.
What happened when a judicial vacancy occurred
during legislative recess, often encompassing two-thirds of
the year? Although the amendment imposed a time limit on
legislative confirmation, the time period began to run on
the "convening date of the next legislative session" for
recess appointments. If a vacancy occurred in May, shortly
after recess, would the legislature have until March of the
following year to confirm the appointment?
The amount of uncertainty and ambiguity that
surrounded the proposed amendment led one commentator
to conclude that Tennesseans were being asked to "buy a
pig in a poke." 159 But despite the many uncertainties and
the wealth of unanswered question raised by Amendment
2's ambiguity, Tennessee presently had no mechanism for
judicial selection. Was the passage of Amendment 2 the
only way out of this calamity?
That was the clear message of many proponents.
Governors, former governors, current and former
legislators, judges, bar leaders, politicians and virtually
everyone, it seemed, undaunted by the lack of detail, joined
forces and funds to encourage the voters to approve the
amendment.160 Some Supreme Court justices joined in,
combined their voices with those who had sought to oust

159 Frank Cagle, "Pig in a Poke:
There are no Rules in
Place for Confirming Judges Under Amendment Two,"

METRO

PULSE

(Sept.

10,

2014),

available

at

http://www.metropulse.com/stories/pig-in-a-poke-there-are
-no-rules-in-place-for-confirming-judges-under-amendment
-two).
160 More than a million dollars was spent to advance the
passage of Amendment 2 in November 2014.
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them three months earlier, 1 6 1 and endorsed the amendment
as the best selection and retention system for Tennessee. 16 2
Those who supported Amendment 2 marketed the
amendment in a number of clever ways. The most modest
strategy was to characterize the amendment as simply
constitutionalizing
the
Tennessee
Plan. 163 That
characterization was wrong in both of its assertions. Firstly,
although often used as a stooge, the constitutionality of the
Tennessee Plan had been resolved repeatedly since 1994.164
Secondly, the selection process under Amendment 2 was
not comparable to the selection, evaluation, and retention

The

concerted

effort to remove three Tennessee
Supreme Court justices failed, thankfully, but not until in
excess of one million dollars was spent on advertising and
marketing.
162 Johnathan 0. Steen, ISay YES on 2, 2014 TENN. BAR. J.
3 (Oct. 2014) (stating that "Amendment 2 is also strongly
supported by leaders in the judiciary, including Chief
Justice Sharon Lee and Justices Wade, Clark, Bivins and
Kirby, and many other appellate and trial court judges.");
Newly Installed Tennessee Supreme Court Justice to
Campaign for ConstitutionalAmendment, THE REPUBLIC
(Aug. 14, 2014) (referring to Justice Bivins who was not a
target of the August 2014 ouster campaign).
163 Former Governor Phil Bredesen and former U.S.
Senator Fred Thompson co-wrote an editorial that stated
that passing the amendment would "put an end to the
questions [of constitutionality] and will help ensure we get
the most qualified, diverse, fair and impartial judges that
Tennesseans want and deserve." Vote Yes on 2, THE
TENNESSEAN (April 29, 2014), available at http://www.tene
ssean.com/story/opinion/contributors/2014/04/29/vote-yesbest-path-judicial-selection/84275 55/.
164 See supra note
97.
161

Spring 2015 | Volume 10 | Issue 2
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 375
process under the Tennessee Plan. 165 Amendment 2
replaced the Tennessee Plan's broad-based selection
process with a purely political process. It eliminated
entirely judicial performance evaluations, which were
based on objective criteria and were intended to inform the
electorate's vote. Amendment 2 gave the legislature the
prerogative to apply its own criteria, including one based
purely on politics. 16 6
One of the most ironic deceptions used by some
proponents was the assertion that passage of the
amendment would "keep the influence of special interest
money away from our judges and out of our state."
Tennesseans had just witnessed the most expensive judicial
race in the state's history waged by three justices fighting
for retention, the very type of system that the Founding
Fathers' Plan embraced. 16 7 Those claiming that retention
See supra notes 27-65 and accompanying text.
166 Some organizations that supported Amendment 2
claimed that they possessed additional information about
the process the legislature ultimately would adopt. On its
website, the Tennessee Bar Association, for example,
asserted that "[a]s the Tennessee Judicial Selection
Amendment is expected to be implemented, the system will
give us a way to select the best possible candidate because
the system will have independence; provide expert
guidance; be made up of a diverse group; have
transparency; be completely informed as to the
qualifications of the candidates; be deliberate; and will
result in a list of the best qualified candidates being
recommended to the governor." http://www.tba.org/info/am
endment-2-to-the-tennessee-constitution.
167 According to the Justice at Stake the amount raised and
spent neared two million dollars, with the justices raising
more than one million, the Tennessee Forum investing
almost half a million, and out-of-state groups including the
165
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elections would inoculate against expensive campaigns
waged by special interest groups were undoubtedly aware
that special interest money had infiltrated many retention
elections in recent years.168
But by far the most troubling aspects of this pro
Amendment 2 marketing message was its adoption and
assertion of an ultimatum: adopt the amendment or subject
appellate judges to expensive, contested, popular elections.
The assertion was based on the threat by some legislators to
enact popular elections in the event the amendment failed.
Their threat was premised on the same straw man, the
indefensible assertion that the Tennessee Plan was
unconstitutional. The validity of the assertion depended
completely on the willingness-and the ability-of those
legislators to make good on their threat. As commentators
noted, this strategy constructed a disingenuous choice: pass
Amendment 2 or succumb to popular judicial elections. 169

Republican State Leadership and the State Government
Leadership Foundation spending another quarter of a
million dollars. http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/pr
ess-releasesl6824/?tvspendingsurgespast_14_million
inhardfoughttennesseejudicialrace&show=news&new
slD=18890).
168 See supra note
89.
169 Judy Cornett, Why I Oppose Proposed
Amendment 2 to
the Tennessee Constitution, Presentation to Hamilton
Burnett Chapter American Inns of Court (Aug. 18, 2014)
(available in author's office) (noting that the "dichotomy
between Amendment 2 and contested popular elections has
been used to blackmail those who oppose contested popular
elections into supporting a plan that gives the General
Assembly unprecedented power in selecting appellate
judges and contains no real safeguards against abuse of
either the appointment power or the confirmation power.").
_
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Despite the absence of details and the presence of
deception, the Tennessee voters overwhelmingly approved
Amendment 2, placing Tennessee in the majority of states
who give the legislature a veto power over judicial
appointments and with the majority of states who fail to
provide voters with meaningful information to inform their
retention votes. The following day, through another
Executive Order, the Governor reaffirmed his commitment
to a more precise judicial selection process. 17 0 Like the
process outlined in the two previous Executive Orders, the
judicial selection process under Executive Order 41 closely
resembles the selection process under the Tennessee
Plan.17 1 But despite an acceptable nomination process, the
gubernatorial appointments have not reflected the diversity
accomplished by the Tennessee Plan, and the percentage of
female judges and judges of color in Tennessee is steadily
declining.
Additionally, as is true of all executive orders,
Executive Order 41 is as easy to alter as it is to dissolve. 17 2
Executive Order 41 (Nov. 6, 2014), available at
http://www.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam4
1.pdf.
Executive Order 41 established the Governor's
Commission for Judicial Appointments (JAC), replacing
the CJA (established by Executive Order 34). The JAC,
which consists of 11 members, 8 of whom are required to
be attorneys, nominates three persons deemed "best and
most qualified" to fill judicial vacancies.
171 Under
Executive Order 41, the JAC accepts
applications, conducts public interviews and hearings, and
deliberates privately, before nominating the three "best and
most qualified" persons to fill judicial vacancies.
172 The power to issue executive orders is not addressed
explicitly in either the Tennessee Constitution, statutes, or
case law. Article III, Section 10 provides that governors
"shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," so
170
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It clearly does not bind future governors or the General
Assembly and, because of its transient nature, it does not
actually even bind the current governor. 173
V. Politics First
With the passage of Amendment 2, the public
entrusted the General Assembly to complete the task of
defining the details of judicial selection in Tennessee.
Because of the general nature of Amendment 2, the passage
of Amendment 2 gave the legislature virtually unchecked
power to define the confirmation and retention process.
But, ultimately, the General Assembly failed to complete
the task and instead, became embroiled in a political
struggle that once again put a premium on political power.

presumably, based upon that Section and the inherent
power of the executive to enforce the law, Tennessee
governors have regularly issued executive orders. For
example, the Tennessee State Library and Archives, for
example, has archived and microfilmed hundreds of
executive
orders
dating
back
to
1953.
See
http://tenessee.gov/tsla/history/state/recordgroups/findingai
ds/rg95.pdf.
173 The question whether a potential candidate, for example,
could seek judicial enforcement of an executive order
seems to be an open question in Tennessee although in
other jurisdictions some scholars have suggested that a
cause of action may be available to force compliance with
an executive order. See Stephen Ostrow, Enforcing
Executive Orders: JudicialReview ofAgency Action Under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 55 GEo WASH. L. REv.
659, 664 (1987) (citing Meat Packers Ass'n v. Butz, 526
F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1975) (suggesting that a cause of action
exists when the order is authorized and evidences an intent,
explicitly or implicitly, to create a private right of action)).
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Senate Bill 1 was filed for introduction on
November 5, 2014, before the 109th General Assembly
convened. Senate Bill 1174 created a 14-member "special,
continuing committee of the General Assembly, (JCC),17 5
which would investigate, interview, and vote on appointees,
before filing a joint resolution recommending confirmation
or rejection of the governor's judicial appointee. The JCC
was required to convene "at least one" public "meeting" 176
and was allowed to conduct "additional interviews" with,

S.B. 1, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014),
available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/I09/Bill/SB00
01.pdf.
175 Section 9(b) of Senate Bill 1 provided that "[t]he
political composition of the judicial confirmation
committee shall reflect as nearly as possible the same ratio
of members from each of the two (2) major political parties
as the parties are represented in the respective houses." Id
174

§ 9(b).
Section 10(b)(1) provided that the JCC "shall convene at
least one (1) meeting of the judicial confirmation
committee." Id § 10(b)(1). Although subsection (2) of
Section 10(b) provided that "[a]ny citizen shall be entitled
to attend the meeting and express in writing the citizen's
approval of, or objections to, the governor's appointee,"
nothing specifies whether the appointee would also be in
attendance. Id. § 10(b)(2). An additional uncertainty was
raised by Section 10(b)(4)(A), which provided that "[a]fter
one (1) public hearing, the judicial confirmation committee
may hold such additional interviews with the appointee as
it deems necessary. . . ." Id § 10(b)(4)(A). It is unclear
whether this "public hearing" is the same as or in addition
to the "meeting," which the public is entitled to attend,
referenced in Section 10(b)(1) & (2). Compare Id with Id
176

§§ 10(b)(1), (2).
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and independent investigations of, the appointee.17 The
members of the JCC, "with each house voting separately,"
would vote to determine whether the respective house
confirmed or rejected the appointee 178 and then would file a
joint resolution reflecting the recommendation, which
would be voted on by the respective houses. 179
Within days of convening, the Senate passed Senate
Bill 1 on first and second reading and referred the bill to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Ultimately, the Senate passed
an amended version of Senate Bill 1, which significantly
altered the confirmation process and removed any
provision for public input. 180 Under the amended version,
Section 10(b)(4)(A) provided that the JCC "may make
independent investigation and inquiry to determine the
qualifications of the appointee for the judicial vacancy." Id
§ 10(b)(4)(A). See also Id § 10(b)(4)(B) (providing that the
JCC may request that the Tennessee Bureau of
investigation "perform appropriate financial and criminal
background investigations and inquiries of a prospective
appointee") (emphasis added). The use of the phrase
"prospective appointee" presumably is intended to refer to
the governor's appointee, which is the phrase used
throughout the remainder of the legislation.
178
Section 10(b)(1) provided that "[t]he judicial
confirmation committee shall vote with each house voting
separately and shall determine by a majority vote of the
committee members of that house present and voting
whether that house recommends confirmation or rejection
of the governor's appointee." Id § 10(b)(1).
179 Section 10(c)(1) provided that a member of the JCC of
each house "shall file a joint resolution reflecting the
recommendation of the member's house." Id § 10(c)(1).
180 The amended legislation allowed the "chair of any
standing committee of the general assembly to which a
notice of appointment . . . [was] referred" to request an
177
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the General Assembly was required to meet in joint session
for the purpose of voting either to confirm or reject the
appointee, who was required to receive a majority vote
from both houses to be confirmed.18 1
The House version of the bill, House Bill 142,
generated a series of amendments, also impacting the
confirmation process. Multiple House amendments offered
various mechanisms for tabulating the votes of each
house, 1 82 with the common theme being to secure House

investigation or, "in accordance with the rules of the
applicable house[, to] conduct a hearing, vote to
recommend confirmation or rejection of the appointee, and
submit a written report of the action taken. . . ." S.B. 1,
109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014), amended by
by S.A. 435 §§ 10(b), (c), 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2014) available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/
Bills/109/Amend/SA0435.pdf Amendment 2 also created a
separate Trial Court Vacancy Commission, consisting of
ten legislators and one attorney, created to submit nominees
for trial court vacancies to the governor. Id § 17.
181 Section 10(d) of Senate Bill 1, as amended by
Amendment 2, provided that "[t]he governor's appointee
shall be confirmed if both houses vote to confirm the
appointee by a majority of all the members to which each
house is entitled. . . ." Id § 10(d).
182 House Amendment 2 to House Bill 142, referred to as
House Amendment 452, provided that the votes of each
house would be tabulated separately and that confirmation
would occur if an appointee received a majority vote from
both houses. H.B. 142, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2014), amended by H.A. 452, 109th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) available at http://www.capitol.tn.
gov/Bills/109/Amend/HAO452.pdf. Amendments 3 and 4
(House Amendments 470 and 482) created tabulation
systems by which each house member's vote equaled one
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supremacy. The version eventually adopted by the House
did so, by providing that confirmation or rejection would be
determined by a majority vote of the general assembly
meeting in joint session. 183 Unsurprisingly, the Senate

point, while each senator's vote equaled three points. See
H.B. 142, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014),
amended by H.A. 470, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. 2014) availableat http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/
109/Amend/HAO470.pdf, H.B. 142, 109th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014), amended by H.A. 482, 109th Gen.
Assem.,
Reg.
Sess.
(Tenn.
2014) available at
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0482.pdf.
"A tabulation of one hundred (100) points to "confirm"
result[ed] in the appointee being confirmed by the general
assembly. Id
183 The House adopted Amendments 6 and 7. Amendment
6 (House Amendment 519) provided that "[a] majority of
votes, to which the general assembly is entitled, cast in the
affirmative shall confirm the appointee." H.B. 142, 109th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014), amended by H.A.
519, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) available
at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0519.pdf
Amendment 7 (House Amendment 520) altered the
language of Senate Amendment 2. Compare H.B. 142,
109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014), amended by
H.A. 520, 109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014)
available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/I09/Amend/H
A0520.pdf with supra note 182. By authorizing the
standing committee to which a notice of appointment has
been referred, rather than the chair of the committee, to
conduct a hearing, vote to recommend or reject, and submit
a written report on the appointee. H.B. 142, 109th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014), amended by H.A. 520,
109th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2014) available at
http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/109/Amend/HA0520.pdf
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rejected the House's approach and the House refused to
recede. 18 4 A report generated by the Senate Conference
Committee failed to receive a majority vote, leaving the
state with nothing but Executive Order 41 to define the
details of its judicial selection, confirmation, and retention
process.
VI.

Conclusion

When the 1 0 9 th General Assembly convened on
January 13, 2015, the legislators, like their frontier
ancestors, had the power to control, in large part, the
composition and, thus, the quality of Tennessee's appellate
bench. With the adoption of Amendment 2, the public
entrusted the legislature with the most essential task of
designing a confirmation process that would assure a highquality appellate judiciary and a retention process that
would allow meaningful voter input. But rather than
complete the task, and despite the fact that a single party
controlled both houses, 185 the House and Senate engaged
in an intra-party squabble and, in the end, promoted
political dominance over public trust on a matter of
extreme importance.
If we as Tennesseans value a fair and independent
judiciary, if we truly desire to "keep the influence . . away
184

The

House

and

Senate

Conference Committee
recommended that the House Amendments 6 and 7, supra
note 183, be deleted.
In 2014, Tennessee Republicans expanded the
supermajorities in both the House and the Senate, holding a
28-5 majority in the Senate and a 73-26 majority in the
House. The supermajority was acquired in November 2012,
making the 108th General Assembly the first since the 90th
General Assembly to have both houses controlled by one
party.
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from our judges and out of our state," then we must
demand that our General Assembly take seriously the trust
we have placed in them with our adoption of Amendment
2. We must require that they adopt a confirmation process
that includes public input and maintains the judiciary as a
separate and independent branch of government as well as
a retention process that provides a meaningful basis upon
which voters may exercise their right to vote. Otherwise,
we too will suffer the tyranny that befalls those
governments in which all government power is
concentrated in the same hands.
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